What if any is the impact of the gender of a loan officer on loan default risk? Using a unique data set for a microbank in Albania over the period 1996 to 2006, we find that loans handled by female loan officers show significantly lower default rates than loans handled by male loan officers, controlling for a variety of borrower, loan, and loan officer characteristics. This effect comes in addition to a lower default rate of female borrowers and cannot be explained by experience differences between female and male loan officer. Our result seems to be driven by differences in monitoring intensity, as we do not see significant differences in the acceptance rates of loan officers of different genders.
I. Introduction
What is the impact of loan officers' gender and experience on loan default risk? While the role of gender has been explored in a variety of fields in finance, such as investment decisions, mutual fund management or equity analyst performance, and the behavior and importance of loan officers in financial institutions has been studied in several recent papers, the impact of loan officers' gender on loan default risk has not been analyzed, yet. This paper uses a unique loanlevel data set for an Albanian microbank over the period 1996 to 2006 to assess the relationship between borrowers' and loan officers' gender and the probability of loan default, controlling for a vast array of borrower, loan and loan officer characteristics. Specifically, controlling for the borrowers' gender, we test whether male or female loan officers experience a lower default probability on their loans and whether this relationship varies with the experience of loan officers.
Understanding the relationship between loan officers' gender and loan default risk is interesting and important for practitioners and researchers alike. Designing incentives for loan officers to minimize loan losses might have to take into account loan officers' gender if empirical findings point to differences between male and female loan officers in their screening and monitoring quality and ability. Exploring the relationship between loan officers' gender and experience and loan default risk also adds to the literature on borrower-loan officer relationships.
Theory provides ambiguous predictions of why the gender of the loan officer might matter for the default probability of "their" borrowers. Consider first the effort exerted by loan officers in screening and monitoring borrowers. Modeling the relationship between loan officer and bank as principal-agent relationship can help understand the incentives of loan officers to exert effort (Agarwal and Wang, 2008) . Female loan officers have typically fewer outside options in the labor market and have therefore stronger incentives to excel in form of low default rates in their loan portfolio.
1 Women are typically less mobile, especially if married, and thus more dependent on the existing job, again increasing their incentives to excel. Especially in developing countries, women are more conservative and more afraid of social sanctions, which increases pressure on female loan officers to perform better than their male colleagues. These arguments are similar to arguments of why female borrowers in developing countries are typically better clients than their male peers (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005) . On the other hand, consider the relationship between loan officer and borrower. In patriarchic societies, male loan officers might have a stronger standing vis-à-vis borrowers, be they male or female, in terms of monitoring and disciplining them, thus ensuring loan repayment. In this case, we would observe lower default probability of loans approved and monitored by male loan officers. Finally, loan officers might have an easier time monitoring and disciplining borrowers of their own gender, hence, we would expect to find a lower default probability of female borrowers if the loan is approved and monitored by a female rather than by a male loan officer, with the reverse holding for male loan officers.
We test several alternative, though not necessarily competing, hypotheses on the relationship between loan officer's gender and experience and loan default probability. On the one hand, experience might be negatively related to loan default risk, if loan officers gain expertise on screening and monitoring borrowers over time (Anderson, 2004) . On the other hand, career concerns might induce younger and less experienced loan officers to undertake a greater effort to avoid loan losses in order to maximize their career progress and thus future income perspectives (Agarwal and Wang, 2008) .
We explore these hypotheses by analyzing a unique data set on more than 43,000 loans over the years 1996 to 2006 provided by a microcredit institution in Albania. For each loan, we can identify the loan officer who screened the borrower and subsequently monitored her over the lifetime of the loan. A possible default of the loan, i.e. arrears beyond a certain number of days, can thus be directly linked to a specific loan officer. The data set includes extensive information about borrower characteristics such as the gender or the marital status of the borrower, loan characteristics such as size, maturity and interest rate of the loan, and loan officer characteristics such as gender and experience within the institution. As Albania is a transition economy and
given that the lender is a typical microcredit institution, we include several variables to capture the different lending technology and different borrower population of such a lender. Specifically, we control for borrower characteristics like, for instance, the number of persons in the household of the borrower or whether a phone is available in the household of the borrower, information that is normally not used/available when using data provided by banks in developed countries.
Critically, we have information on both successful and rejected loan applicants, which allows us to test whether differences in default risk across loan officers of different gender are driven by selection bias to the extent that female or male loan officers select better performing borrowers ex-ante.
Our results indicate that loans handled by female loan officers have a significantly lower default probability than those of their male counterparts. This result is robust to controlling for borrower's gender and for the correlation between borrower's and loan officer's gender. We also find only very little variation of women's superior performance vis-à-vis men with their experience as loan officer, suggesting that our results are not driven by women having harder access to loan officer positions. This result holds over different samples. Specifically, we confirm our finding both for first loans as well as for repeat loans of the same borrowers, with a stronger effect for first loans. We interpret this as supporting for our hypothesis that female loan officers in this microbank face stronger incentives or have better skills in dealing with borrowers, as the agency problems between bank and borrower should be stronger for first time borrowers. We also test for differences in the approval rates of loan applicants between female and male loan officers. Controlling for a vast array of borrower characteristics, we cannot find any difference between female and male loan officers in their acceptance of applicants, suggesting that the performance advantage of female loan officers is in their monitoring of borrowers rather than their screening. This also confirms that our findings are not driven by selection bias of female loan officers dealing with borrowers that have ex-ante a different risk profile.
By investigating gender differences in the context of loan officers, this paper is related to a growing body of studies on the role of loan officers in financial institutions. For instance, Andersson (2004) finds that senior loan officers come to more consistent decisions than inexperienced loan officers. Berger and Udell (2004) argue that the loan officers' experience with severe business environments decays in boom periods and, as a result, also substandard borrowers get loans. Hertzberg et al. (2008) show that loan officers are more likely to reveal negative information in the case of job rotation because it seems to be better if the loan officer reveals this kind of negative information herself instead of having bad information being revealed by a successor loan officer. Liberti and Mian (Forthcoming) find that the higher the decision maker is in the bank's hierarchy, the lower the importance of soft information gets because the unverifiable soft information looses reliability over hierarchy levels. Finally, in a recent paper, Agarwal and Wang (2008) argue that loan officer's choice of effort depends on the incentive scheme implemented by the bank, the information asymmetry between the loan officer and the bank, and the loan officer's career concerns. Our results add a new facet to this literature. They suggest that not only the institutional design of financial institutions matter (Berger et al., 2005; Mian, 2006) , but also the gender of the people operating in it.
Our study is also related to the literature studying gender disparities in risk taking and performance. Several papers have shown that female decision makers are more risk averse than male decision makers (Barsky et al., 1997; Agnew et al., 2003) and that this higher risk aversion affects financial decision (Charness and Gneezy, 2007; Christiansen et al., 2006; Barber and Odean, 2001 ). Other authors have explored the behavior of women in different competitive environments and their treatment within financial institutions (Gneezy et al., 2003, Forthcoming; Niederle and Vesterlund, Forthcoming; Black and Strahan, 2001, Goldin and Rouse, 2000) . Green et al. (2008) analyze the performance of male versus female Wall Street equity analysts and document that the male analysts seem to have better forecasting abilities, i.e. women seem to perform worse at hard, quantifiable tasks. On the other hand, they also report that female analysts seem to perform better at non-quantifiable aspects of the job such as client service.
Our work contributes to this literature by documenting that women may perform better than men at quantifiable job aspects such as the management of default risk. The results further suggest that this is not driven by a higher degree of risk aversion as we do not find significant differences between female and male loan officers in the loan approval decision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the data, and section III the methodology. Section IV presents our main results and section V contains robustness checks and further analyses. Section VI concludes.
II. Data
We use a unique data set of both rejected and accepted loan applicants from a microcredit lender in Albania. Specifically, we have information on over 43,000 loan applications and 31,000 loans given by the lender over the period January 1996 to December 2006, i.e. the first eleven years of operation of this microcredit institution. While the microcredit lender is part of an international network, it works with local management and loan officers. Specifically, our data set contains information on 203 loan officers and covers five branches of the lender in the Albanian capital, Tirana. Unlike other microcredit institutions, the lender grants only individual (not joint liability or group) loans, for business, real estate, and consumption purposes. While the lender clearly focuses on the low-income and small-enterprise segment, and has thus a doublebottom line approach of both profitability and increasing access to credit, financial sustainability and therefore profitability is the primary goal. We include a vast array of borrower, loan officer and loan characteristics in the regression of loan defaults. The correlations in Panel B of Table 2 show that female, older, and married borrowers and borrowers with a phone face a lower default probability, while household size and employment status are not correlated with default probability. There are also many significant correlations among borrower characteristics. For example, female borrowers are less likely to be married or self-employed and live in smaller households.
We also control for several loan characteristics that might affect a loan's default probability. Specifically, we control for the annualized interest rate, the log of the approved amount and the log of the adjusted maturity of the loan. 7 Further, we include the ratio of approved to applied loan amount and the type of collateral (personal, mortgage, or chattel guarantee) provided. 8 Higher interest rates can result in adverse selection of borrowers with riskier projects and in riskier behavior of borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . Similarly, a lower approved share might signal higher default risk, while longer-term loans tend to be riskier. On the other hand, there is a-priori no clear relationship between collateral or loan purpose and default 7 Some loans in the database mature after 2006. These loans' maturity was adjusted to December 31, 2006 in order to be able to compare the outstanding loans with already matured loans. 8 The use of chattel guarantees is quite common in developing economies as objects from the household of a borrower (such as a fridge or a television) often have very high (not necessarily monetary) values for the borrowers.
risk. The descriptive statistics in Table 2A show that annualized interest rates varied between 4.3 and 24 percent, with an average of 13.8 percent. The average loan size is 3,700 US dollars, while the loan maturity varies between 1 month and 6 years, with an average of 16 months. On average, borrowers received 88.8 percent of the amount they applied for. 9 96.2 percent of all loans were secured with chattel collateral, while 12.4 percent provided mortgages and 15.0 percent personal guarantees.
The correlations in Panel B of Table 2 show that longer-term loans, loans with higher interest rates and loans that are smaller relative to the amount originally applied for are more likely to default, while loan size is not significantly correlated with default probability. Loans with a personal guarantee are more likely to default, while other guarantees are not significantly correlated with default probability. Larger and longer-term loans, loans with personal and mortgage guarantees carry lower interest rates. Some of the loan characteristics are also correlated with borrower characteristics. Female borrowers, for example, pay lower interest rates and are less likely to default.
Finally, we control for several loan officer characteristics. Specifically, in addition to the gender of loan officers, we include their age and the number of loan applications they have processed, counted from the first loan they ever processed since they started working for the lender. The correlation of age and experience with default probability is ex-ante not clear. While age and experience might improve loan officers' performance (Anderson, 2004) , the career concern view discussed in Agarwal and Wang (2008) would predict the opposite relationship.
The age of loan officers in our sample ranges from 19 to 32 years, with an average of 25 years.
On average, loan officers have processed already 223 loan applications. Additionally, we find huge differences in their experience because the number of already processed loans ranges from 1 to over 1,000 loans. The correlations in Table 2B indicate that female loan officers are, on average, younger, while they do not have more experience in terms of loan applications processed. Older analysts have processed more loan applications. Female loan officers are more likely to process loan applications of female, younger, non-married, and not self-employed borrowers. Female loan officers provide larger loans, for longer maturities and at lower interest rates. They are more likely to process loans with personal or mortgage guarantees, but less likely to process loans collateralized with chattel guarantees.
III. Methodology
We use several regression specifications to disentangle the relationship between loan default probability and the gender of borrowers and loan officers. We pay particular attention to loan officer experience to investigate whether different experience levels can explain our results.
Specifically, it may be that loan officer gender related loan performance differences are driven by higher experience levels of a specific loan officer group. We explicitly control for this in our regressions.
The significant correlations between the different borrower, loan officer and loan characteristics in the previous section stress the importance of multivariate regressions.
Specifically, for the first set of results we utilize a binary probit model of the following form:
referring to borrower and loan i, X j is a vector of control variables referring to loan officer j and is an error term. In addition, we include dummies for the five branches of the lender to control for potential clustering of loan officers of a certain gender or ability in a specific branch, year dummies to control for macroeconomic factors that might affect default risk of borrowers, and five business sector dummies (construction, production, other services, trade, transport) to control for risk differences associated with the business sector the borrower operates in. Results for these additional controls will be omitted from the tables. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level, thus allowing for unobserved correlation between loans processed and monitored by the same loan officer (Froot, 1989) .
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Given that loan officers may be more likely to deal with borrowers of the same sex, for our second set of results we will utilize several interaction terms to disentangle the relationship between default probability and gender of borrower and loan officer where the combination female borrower-male loan officer is the omitted category. The coefficient β 1 thus indicates whether female borrowers are more or less likely to default with a female than with a male loan officer, while the difference between β 2 and β 3 indicates whether male borrowers are more or less likely to default with a female than with a male loan officer. This specification therefore allows us to not only control for the correlation between borrower and loan officer gender, but also to distinguish between the performance difference of female and male loan officers among borrowers of different genders. Similarly, we can assess the performance of female vs. male borrowers by considering the difference between β 1 and β 2 (for female loan officers) and the coefficient on β 3 (for male loan officers).
Finally, with our third set of results we assess whether the relationship between gender and default probability varies with the experience of loan officers. For that purpose we add to specification (2) interaction terms between the borrower-loan officer dummy of interest and a variable proxying for the loan officer's experience. Specifically, we control for loan officer experience by interaction the borrower-loan officer gender with four experience quartiles 75-100 percent). This regression specification yields twelve borrower-gender-experience interaction terms, the omitted category being the combination female borrower-male loan officer.
The experience proxies we use are the number of loan applications already handled by the loan officer, the number of years the loan officer has worked for the microlender, and the loan officer's age. The sign and significance of the coefficient β 1,1 (β 1,4 ) indicate whether female loan officers with very low (very high) experience have lower default rates for female borrowers than male loan officers, independent of the experience of the male loan officers. If experience differences drive the superior performance of female loan officers, then we would expect to find a significant effect only for high experience levels (i.e. β 1,3 and β 1,4 , that is, the third and fourth experience quartile).
While specification (3) tests the influence of experience on loan officer performance for the case of female borrowers, we also run a regression where the combination male borrowerfemale loan officer is the omitted category. This specification allows us to test if and how potential performance differences between female and male loan officers for male borrowers depend on loan officer experience.
While the signs of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables indicate whether an increase of that explanatory variable increases or decreases the probability of loan default, the estimated coefficients of probit models do not allow us to assess the economic size of a change in the explanatory variable. In the results section, we therefore only present marginal coefficient estimates that are computed at the sample mean in order to be also able to derive the economic significance of our results.
IV. Main results
The results in Column 1 of Table 3 suggest that female borrowers and borrowers served by female loan officers are less risky. The default probability of female borrowers is 4.2 percent lower than that of male borrowers across our sample of first (and last) loans. We also find that the default probability of borrowers served by female loan officers is 4.7 percent lower than the default probability of borrowers served by male loan officers. Both effects are economically significant, as the average default rate in our sample is 13.5 percent. On the other hand, the default probability does not vary with the experience of the loan officer. The number of loan applications the loan officer has already processed, one of our proxies for a loan officer's experience, does not enter significantly.
Several other loan officer, borrower and loan characteristics enter significantly in the column 1 regression of Table 3 . First, older borrowers and borrowers served by older loan officers are less likely to default. The latter result contradicts the career concern hypothesis by Aggarwal and Wang (2008) . Second, consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , the interest rate is positively, significantly, and economically very substantially associated with a higher default probability. Third, married borrowers and borrowers from households where a phone is available are less likely to default, suggesting higher opportunity costs for these borrowers. Fourth, larger loans and loans with longer maturities are more likely to turn non-performing. Fifth, the higher the ratio of approved to applied loan amount, the lower is the default probability. Finally, loans with personal guarantees are more likely to turn bad, while loans guaranteed with mortgages are less likely to default. An explanation for this finding may be that personal guarantees, which are third-party guarantees, induce a moral hazard, while the potential loss of the own house sets strong repayment incentives. Overall, the fit of our model is satisfactory, with 75% of the defaulted loans predicted correctly and 61% of the non-defaulted loans and a Pseudo R-square of 13%.
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Since the finding that female loan officers experience lower default rates might be driven by the fact that female borrowers are less risky than male borrowers and might be more often served by female loan officers, we next construct borrower gender-loan officer gender combinations as dummy variables and run a regression using regression specification (2).
Specifically, we interact borrower and loan officer gender, with the combination female borrower-male loan officer being the omitted category. In our baseline sample, 68% (55%) of female (male) borrowers are screened and monitored by female loan officers.
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the robustness of our previous findings to controlling for the correlation between borrowers' and loan officers' genders. Compared to female borrowers monitored by male loan officers, female borrowers monitored by female loan officers have a default probability that is 4.3 percent lower. Similarly, we find that the default probability of 11 In classifying observations, predicted probabilities significantly higher than 13.5% (average default probability) are classified as default observations and those below 13.5% are classified as no default. We adjust this benchmark depending on the sample and default definition. male borrowers monitored by female loan officers is 4.8 percent lower than the default probability of male borrowers monitored by male loan officers. This suggests that, independent of the gender of the borrower, female loan officers are better in managing default risk.
Comparing the marginal effects of the different borrower-loan officer dummies, we also confirm that male borrowers are more likely to default than female borrowers. In the case of female loan officers, male borrowers default 4.4 percent more often and in the case of male loan officers they default 3.8 percent more often. Our previous findings on the different loan officer, loan and borrower characteristics are confirmed by this regression.
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 3 show the robustness of our results to using alternative definitions of default. Specifically, we redefine default as having a payment in arrears for more than 15 days (column 3), 60 days (column 4) and 90 days (column 5). Our findings are all confirmed for the stricter default definition of 15 days. Here we also find that the advantage of female loan officers vis-à-vis their male peers appears to be stronger for female borrowers (5.8 percent) than for male borrowers (4.9 percent). In the case of less strict definitions (columns 4 and 5), the size of the marginal effect of loan officer's gender for female borrower declines but stays significant, while the effect of loan officer's gender turns insignificant for male borrowers.
Finally, in column 6 of Table 3 we confirm our findings for a larger sample of first loans for which we have also subsequent loan information. Here, we do not restrict our attention to the first loans that were at the same time the last (and thus only) loans by the borrowers, but we use all first loans available in the database. As in this case we cannot be sure that the sociodemographic information has not changed after the first loan, we exclude all socio-demographic variables from the regression. This less strict cut of the data leaves us with a sample containing 14,020 first loans. The column 6 results of Table 3 show that even in this larger sample, we confirm our finding that female loan officers are more efficient in preventing a loan default than their male peers.
12 While the marginal effects are somewhat smaller in size, we still find that female loan officers are better in preventing loan defaults than their male peers, both for female and for male borrowers. The results for the other controls are very similar to our previous regressions. The overall fit of the model decreases, as can be seen from the Pseudo R-squares and the percentages of correctly predicted observations, underlining the importance of the sociodemographic borrower characteristics in predicting default.
Our results so far suggest that female loan officers are more efficient in preventing loan defaults than male loan officers. However, these results might be driven by different levels of job experience. For instance, if female loan officers were more experienced in monitoring borrowers than their male peers, we might expect them to perform better, that is, have lower default rates.
To control for this possible driver of the results, we interact the borrower gender-loan officer gender dummy variable with different levels of loan officer experience. Specifically, we utilize four experience quartiles and build an interaction term for each quartile. This yields four interaction terms for each borrower-loan officer-experience quartile combination, and twelve interaction terms overall. As before, the combination female borrower-male loan officer is the reference category. Loan officer experience is proxied by the number of previous loan applications the loan officer has processed 13 , the number of years the loan officer has worked for the microlender, and the age of the loan officer. The Table 4 regressions are thus based on regression specification (3).
The Table 4 , Panel A, column 1 regression shows that the advantage of female loan officers in managing the default risk of female borrowers holds for all, but the lowest quartile of experience. Specifically, for the second, third and fourth quartiles of job experience, we can 12 For this regression we use the 30 days in arrears default definition. In unreported regressions we confirm our earlier findings using this bigger sample without socio-demographic data for the alternative default definitions. 13 We divide the number of loan applications per loan officer by 1,000 for scaling reasons.
confirm that female loan officers perform better than male loan officers. The sizes of the marginal effects are similar to our previous finding from Table 3 , column 2, and first increase up to the third quartile of experience before decreasing again. In Panel B, we use the combination male borrower-female loan officer as reference category. We find that female loan officers are better than male loan officers in managing default risk of male borrowers for the third and fourth quartiles of experience. The economic significance of the effect is considerably higher than before, in particular for very high levels of experience.
Column 2 presents the results when using the time since the loan officer works for the microlender as experience proxy. The use of this alternative experience proxy shows that the performance difference for female borrowers exists at all but the highest levels of experience.
Interestingly, though, the effect vanishes at the fourth quartile of experience. The magnitude of the effect is again similar to before. We further find that the performance gap with regard to male borrowers exists already for medium experience and remains significant up to very high experience, being statistically significant for the second, third and fourth quartiles.
Finally, column 3 presents the results when using loan officer age as experience proxy.
While being only a crude experience proxy, the use of this third alternative does not alter our findings. As before, the performance of female loan officers with regard to female borrowers is only indistinguishable from male loan officers for low levels of experience, but significantly better for the second, third and fourth quartiles of their age. For male borrowers, we again find performance differences for high and very high experience levels.
All in all, we conclude from these tests that the superior performance of female loan officers for female borrowers is not driven by their higher experience. Only for male borrowers we find slight evidence that the performance advantage of female loan officers relative to their male counterparts is significant only at experience levels above the median.
V. Robustness and Additional Tests
We subject our findings to several sensitivity analyses in order to test their robustness but also to explore the channels through which the relationship between loan officer gender and default probability works. We fist loosen the strict sample selection that we had chosen for our baseline regression. Specifically, we expand the sample from first loans to borrowers' subsequent, that is, repeat, loans. This allows us a robustness test in two aspects: first, we have a different sample, but, second, we expect a less significant relationship between the gender of the loan officer and default probability as the information asymmetries and thus agency problems between bank and borrower should be lower. We thus would interpret a somewhat weaker finding of a female performance advantage on the sample of subsequent borrowers as confirmation of women's advantage in monitoring borrowers. We also test for this directly by including an interaction term with a variable indicating the duration of the borrower's relationship with the microbank.
For this robustness check we include several control variables that capture a borrower's loan history with the bank. While for first loans there is no loan history available, here we can make use of historic information. Specifically, we control for the duration of the lending relationship in years, whether any previous loan application of the borrower has been rejected and whether the borrower has ever defaulted on any loan granted by the lender before applying for a new loan. We thus use specification (2) and add the three control variables for the borrowers' loan history with the bank. As in the baseline regression, we first focus on a sample of last loans to be able to control for socio-demographic borrower characteristics. Cutting the data in this way leaves us with 6,448 repeat loans. We then drop the socio-demographic variables and focus on a broader sample of repeat loans. This yields a sample size of 12,940 loans. Focusing on further loans and including loan history variables increases the fit of the model significantly, as can be seen from the higher Pseudo R-square and percentages of correctly predicted defaults.
The results in column 1 of Table 5 confirm the findings and their interpretation with a regression using repeat instead of first loans. We continue to find that female borrowers screened and monitored by female loan officers have a lower default probability than if screened and monitored by male loan officers, while there is no significant difference for male borrowers.
However, even in the case of female borrowers, the economic size is substantially smaller than before, with only 1.8 percent, compared to the 4.3 percent we found in Table 3 , column 2. Large proportions of the explanatory power seem to shift to the loan history data. This observation is consistent with Mester et al. (2007) who show that previous customer information help financial institutions to monitor their borrowers. Specifically, we find that defaults are on average 37.1 (3.7) percent more likely if the same borrower defaulted on a previous loan (had a rejected loan application before). In spite of this, however, we continue to find a loan officer effect. This is a very interesting finding because it illustrates that even if historic, loan default relevant borrower information is used, there are still differences between female and male loan officers. 14 The column 2 regression of Table 5 shows that this performance gap is not a function of how long the borrower has been borrowing from the institution because the interaction terms between the borrower-loan officer gender pairs and the duration of the lending relationship do not enter significantly.
The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 largely confirm these findings for a larger sample of 12,940 subsequent loans that is not limited to last loans. As before, we do not use the socio-demographic borrower characteristics for these regressions, which again reduces the fit of the model. The column 3 results without the interaction term show that the performance advantage of female vis-à-vis male loan officers is now only 1.5 percent for female borrowers.
For male borrowers the advantage is 1.0 percent, but only weakly significant. The size of the performance gap for female borrowers in column 4 remains, but looses significance, and the unreported marginal effect for male borrowers does also not enter significantly. Again, we do not find that the performance gap is a function of the duration of borrowers' lending relationship with the bank. Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that the performance advantage of female vis-à-vis male loan officers continues to hold for repeat loans. However, this is true only in the case of female borrowers. We also find that this effect is smaller for repeat loans compared with first loans, while it is not a function of the duration of borrowers' relationship with the bank. It thus seems that the learning effect that reduces the performance advantage of female loan officers vis-à-vis their male counterparts kicks in with the second loan. Specification (4) differs from (2) since the dependent variable is now a dummy variable indicating whether a loan application was approved (Approval i = 1) or not. This enables us to test if female loan officers are less likely than their male counterparts to accept loan applicants of a specific gender. Performing this test allows us to exclude ex ante borrower selection as the driver of the performance differences between female and male loan officers. Specifically, if we do not find any significant difference between female and male loan officers, then ex ante selection does not drive our previous findings. In contrast to specification (2) we are not able to use some loanrelated control variables, such as the interest rate, because these are not available at the time of the loan application. Note also that rather than using the approved loan amount as a loan size proxy, we use the applied loan amount, and rather than using the approved maturity we use the applied maturity.
We test for ex ante sample selection using four different samples. At first, we use a sample of first loan applications, which at the same time were the last applications, thus corresponding to the specification of Table 3 (columns I to V), with 8,297 loan applicants, around 92% of which were accepted.
15 Second, we drop the socio-demographic variables and include all first loan applications, yielding a sample of 15,986 loan applications. Third, we use a sample of repeat borrowers. Again, we run a specification with loan applications that were at the same time last loan applications (sample size of 7,240 loan applications) and a specification without this restriction and thus without socio-demographic borrower characteristics (14,502 loan applications).
The results in Table 6 illustrate that our finding of a superior performance of female vis-à-vis male loan officers is not driven by selection bias of the borrowers or better screening capacity of female loan officers. We do not find any significant difference in the likelihood of borrowers to be accepted by female or male loan officers, independent of whether the borrower is male or female. Further, we do find that male loan officers are more likely to accept loan applications of male clients. Overall, this test suggests that screening differences between female and male loan officers do not drive the performance gap between them. It rather indicates that the results are driven by better monitoring of the female loan officers.
VI. Conclusions
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to consider gender differences in loan officer performance. While some papers have reported gender differences with regard to investment decisions (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001; Charness and Geezy, 2007) or the general behavior of women in competitive environments (e.g. Gneezy et al., Forthcoming; Niederle and Vesterlund, Forthcoming), we provide novel results about the role of gender in financial institutions. Contrary to Green et al. (2008) who document that women seem to perform worse than men in quantifiable aspects of the job, we find convincing evidence that women may also perform better than men in quantifiable job aspects such as the management of loan default risk.
Although the job environment in financial institutions is usually highly competitive, we further find counter-evidence to several papers (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003) which show that females underperform their male peers in highly competitive environments. Additionally, we find that borrowers served by older loan officers are less likely to default which is in line with results from
Anderson (2004) but on the other hand contradicts the career concern hypothesis by Aggarwal and Wang (2008).
Our estimations also shed light on the mechanisms. We find that female loan officers are not more or less likely to accept borrowers with the same characteristics. Further, ex-ante risk differences captured by interest rates do not influence our findings as we explicitly control for the interest rate in our regressions. It thus seems to be the better monitoring of borrowers that explains the lower default risk in the case of female loan officers. Finally, there is no convincing evidence that better experience explains the advantage of female loan officers vis-à-vis their male colleagues.
Our results do not only contribute to the literature on gender differences in finance and economics, but also to the growing body of literature on the role of loan officers in financial institutions. They suggest that the performance of loan officers in financial institutions is not only driven by setting the right incentives, for instance by implementing a routine job rotation mechanism as in Hertzberg et al. (2008) , or by the degree of asymmetric information in the institution as in Agarwal and Fang (2008) , but also by gender-specific differences between female and male loan officers. This table contains a broad overview for the 5 Tirana branches of the Albanian microlender. The loan size is given in US dollars and the interest rate is per annum. The default frequency is measured as the occurrence of a borrower being in arrears for more than 30 days during the lifetime of her loan. It is not the yearly default frequency, but rather the default frequency of all loans being granted in 1996, 1997, and so on. Business loans incorporate investments into fixed assets and working capital. Real estate loan usages include the purchase, construction, improvement and extension of houses. Table 3 . They are at the same time first and last loans per borrower. The dependent variable is the occurrence of a borrower being in arrears for more than 30 days during the lifetime of her loan. In addition to the already used independent variables described in Table 3 we interact Female & Female loan officer with the loan officer's experience that is proxied by the number of loan applications handled by the respective loan officer until a certain loan was granted (I); the time since the loan officer works for the microlender (II), and the age of the loan officer at the time of the loan approval. To test whether the loan officer effects depends on loan officer experience we use interactions with the four experience quartiles for each experience proxy. Control variables are the same as in This table contains the marginal effects of the outcome test with the gender of borrowers and loan officers together with interactions with the duration of the lending relationship. Regression models I and II (III and IV) are based on the sub sample of 6,448 first and last (12,940 first) loans to individual, private borrowers. The dependent variable is the occurrence of a borrower being in arrears for more than 30 days during the lifetime of her loan. The independent variables are as in previous tables except for three variables for the loan history of each borrower with the microlender: Duration relationship provides the number of years since the first loan application of the borrower, Any previous application rejected is a dummy variable indicating any previous rejection of a loan application (1 = rejection), Any previous loan defaulted is a dummy variable indicating any previous default (1 = default). We further use three interaction terms between the borrower gender-loan officer gender pairs and Duration relationship in regression models II and IV. Results for our additional control variables are omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. ,240 loan applications that are at the same time further and last applications per borrower; model IV is based on 14,502 further loan applications. The dependent variable is the approval decision (1 for an approved loan, 0 otherwise). We use a different set of control variables because we cannot use variables that are not available at the time of the loan application, such as the interest rate. Specifically, we employ the natural logarithm of the applied instead of the approved loan size, and the natural logarithm of the applied instead of the approved maturity. We use the same further control variables described in Table 3 . Results for these control variables are omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
